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Most readers of Alasdair MacIntyre do not take him to be a revolutionary. If one reads only his 
works from the past thirty years, one might easily categorize him as a conservative. No doubt due 
to his sustained critique of modern liberalism, many of those labelled today as neoconservatives 
have embraced this ersatz version of his thought.1 Yet as becomes clear in his most recent book, 
Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism and his critique of liberal moral 
theory are not rooted in a reactionary longing for a golden-age past.2 They derive, on the contrary, 
from his deep engagement with that bane of all economic and moral conservatives, Karl Marx, and 
his interest in Marxist revolution. 
Of course, MacIntyre is no “vulgar Marxist.” Instead, his work stands as revolutionary in its 
own way. As Walter Benjamin once wrote, amid unleashed and overwhelming capitalism, 
revolutions may be more like an attempt “to activate the emergency break” than to launch history 
forward.3 As we narrate in §1 below, there can be no doubt that we all now live in a time of 
capitalism run out of control. Thus, to resist the new brand of nihilism emerging from capitalism’s 
unceasing stream of “creative destruction” will require new ways forward that are nothing short of 
radical. 
MacIntyre, we suggest, might just be the revolutionary we need. Or, to be more precise, the 
counter-revolutionary. In this article, we argue that at the heart of MacIntyre’s work is not a 
template for visions of isolated communities of restorationist reactionaries. Rather, he points us 
toward a radical pedagogy dedicated to the creation of thickly-engaged communities of virtue 
capable of resisting the fragmenting, isolating, and vicious forces of capital. To make this case, we 
bring MacIntyre into conversation with others who share this vision, in particular Paulo Freire, 
and we connect MacIntyre’s agenda with the creation of communities of practice, as prototyped 
by the base communities of liberation theology. In conclusion, we argue that what MacIntyre has 
sought so thoroughly to develop over the entire course of his career is a moral theory capable of 
sustaining a revolutionary alternative to the alienating and dehumanizing operations of capitalism 
located in the basic elements of shared concrete practices. Thus, virtues are the elements of a 
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radical praxis of freedom, a freedom that counters the imperialism of the capitalist, liberal state 
through the collective practice of a self-possessed, unified ethical life. 
To make this argument, we first describe the social impact of capitalism, particularly in its 
latest, most aggressive neoliberal version. We then revisit MacIntyre’s Marxist roots and his 
sustained critique of capitalism as a way of illuminating what he takes to be the deeper problem 
with liberalism and its correlative ethic of expressivism. Finally, we connect MacIntyre’s thesis to 
the radical pedagogy of Paulo Freire and the examples of base communities in order to contend 
that communities of practice epitomize the kind of ethical and tradition-based revolution at the 
heart of MacIntyre’s project. 
 
1. Cultural Dissolution, Moral Irresolution: The Fruit of Neoliberalism’s Silent Revolution 
As we move toward the quarter mark of the Twenty-First Century, our society lurches at an ever-
increasing pace toward a dystopian order under the late twentieth-century ascendance of 
neoliberalism. Termed “the silent revolution” by Oxford economic historian Avner Offer, the 
fragmenting and deconstructive effects of this new, distinctive, deeply disseminated rationality 
came into its own around 1980. While it has vastly increased the wealth of the few—wealth on the 
level the world has likely never seen before—for the many, it has mostly left a path of destruction 
in its wake.4 Insofar as it has also profoundly permeated our social, individual, and moral 
infrastructures, neoliberalism has invisibly and profoundly shaped the self-understanding of the 
students who sit in our classrooms, the infrastructure of their families and their futures, and 
increasingly the discourse and policies of the colleges and universities in which moral theologians 
and philosophers seek to transmit traditions of moral inquiry. 
A number of contemporary theorists have charted the economic, social, psychological, and 
cultural effects of neoliberalism, chief among them David Harvey, Wendy Brown, Naomi Klein, 
and Wolfgang Streeck.5 Bruce Rogers-Vaughn summarizes some of these effects succinctly in his 
important book, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age. Drawing on Robert Putnam’s 2015 analysis 
of the impacts of neoliberalism on Port Clinton, Ohio, entitled Our Kids: The American Dream in 
Crisis, Rogers-Vaughn details the corrosive effects of neoliberal ideology and its attendant 
growing economic inequality on class, communities, families, and education in the United States.6 
Just a few of those effects include: a decline in manufacturing jobs from roughly 50% to 25% of 
total employment in a short period of three decades; a gradual decline in real wages; longer 
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commutes to replace lost wages, stressing families and fragmenting communities; a doubling to 
quadrupling of the divorce rate depending on location; a jump in childhood poverty rates from 4% 
to 35%; increasing class segregation; declining educational levels; declining social mobility; and 
marked increases in juvenile delinquency.7 This social fragmentation has been attended by 
extraordinary increases over the past forty years in rates of mental illness,8 opioid addiction,9 
suicide,10 and suddenly, after rising for decades, a three-year decline in life expectancy due to 
increasing mortality rates for middle-aged persons.11 
For Rogers-Vaughn, these effects are due not only to the direct economic effects of 
neoliberalism—i.e., the increase in economic hardships for most people and rise in economic 
inequality—but as importantly to the socio-cultural commitments embedded in the neoliberal 
framework, particularly what he names deinstitutionalization, desymbolization, and 
desubjectification. Centered in extreme individualism, neoliberalism seeks the dismantling of 
cultural institutions (such as public schools, universities, government, or churches) as well as 
collectives that nurture interpersonal relationships.12 Equally, neoliberal culture erodes and flattens 
any symbolic language, images, or values that “have the ability to resist those of the market.”13 
Finally, neoliberalism desubjectifies persons, leading to what Christopher Bollas has named the 
“normotic personality,” indicating “an individual [who] suffers a numbing or erasure of 
subjectivity, experiencing herself as a commodity in a world of commodities.”14 
What is more, with the ascendency of cultural capitalism, the production of culture itself, from 
movies and music to literature, child-rearing, and marriage are increasingly commodified and 
individualized. Social fragmentation and dissolution of civic participation have been well 
described by sociologists like Robert Putnam, Robert Bellah, Daniel Bell, and Theda Skocpol.15 
Broad atomization has resulted in the decline of membership in civic and broader social institutions 
as well as severely weakened the social bonds that knit a society together. Work is more unstable 
and more fluid. Social relations become more virtual; social bonds less enduring. Churches, 
unions, local clubs, and all other social organizations are on the decline, even as tertiary 
associations (political mailing lists or online communities) and lifestyle enclaves expand. 
Is it coincidence or prescience, then, that the first edition of MacIntyre’s After Virtue appeared 
in 1981? Here MacIntyre prophetically adds to the above landscape an abiding concern with the 
epistemic crisis of the late-Twentieth and early Twenty-First Centuries. On the cusp of the socio-
cultural fragmentation detailed above, MacIntyre boldly named the already-unfolding 
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fragmentation underlying an emergent cultural reality: the irresolvability of moral disputes. In the 
memorable opening pages of After Virtue, MacIntyre echoes the science-fiction novel A Canticle 
for Liebowitz,16 asking his reader to imagine a situation where the field of science has been entirely 
destroyed, disbanded, and prohibited. Those trying to revive the tradition have only fragments, 
lacking any unifying theory to make sense of their significance or how they integrate. As a result, 
“arbitrariness” dominates the field due to the fact that no agreed upon premises give shape to the 
remnants of fragmented scientific expressions.17 
MacIntyre reprises this scenario to propose what was at the time his radical thesis: 
 
The hypothesis I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the 
language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural 
science in the imaginary world which I described. What we possess […] are the 
fragments of a conceptual scheme […]. We possess indeed simulacra of morality 
[…]. But we have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our comprehension, both 
theoretical and practical, of morality.18 
 
Thus, interminable dispute pervades our moral discourse; any possibility of rational agreement has 
vanished. 
In the place of ethics, our discourse is now entirely shaped by emotivism, the theory that “all 
moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling,” and 
therefore cannot be either true or false.19 As such, differences between moral perspectives cannot 
be resolved rationally—i.e., through a mutual process of face-to-face discussion that entails giving 
reasons that stand “independent of the relationship between speaker and hearer.”20 Rather, moral 
disagreement devolves into little more than assertion and counter-assertion, a mere clash of 
arbitrary wills that can only be resolved, in the end, “by producing certain non-rational effects on 
the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with us”—in other words, through various 
exercises of power, such as manipulation, legal action, or bureaucratic processes that identify who 
can decide.21 As such, contemporary moral discourse is, in effect, little more than managerial 
technocracy or Nietzschean will-to-power. MacIntyre offers as the only real alternative 
Aristotelian virtue theory cultivated through practices—namely, those “coherent and complex 
form[s] of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that 
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form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human concepts of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.”22 
As bleak as the landscape seemed when he penned the first edition of After Virtue, over the last 
forty years, the social state of moral discourse has devolved even further. In 2016, MacIntyre 
returns to these themes in Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity. Here, he opens not with a 
description of culture and moral discourse catastrophically fragmented. Instead, he posits a 
different problematic, that of “lives that go wrong on account of misdirected or frustrated desire.”23 
Depicting a number of scenarios that echo the fragmented, despairing lives Rogers-Vaughn 
describes, MacIntyre zeroes in on the moral paralysis or despair experienced by so many. Again, 
he suggests, emotivism—now renamed “expressivism”24—has a choke-hold on the moral self-
understanding of those in Western culture. Yet to dislodge expressivism’s grip, in this text he takes 
a different tack from that of After Virtue, granting to desire a critical role in moral reasoning and 
moral action while continuing to argue that Arisotelian virtue theory—now renamed 
NeoAristotelianism—provides a better account of the role of desire in moral reasoning. 
Chasing an Aristotelian-styled inquiry, beginning with everyday questions at hand and 
proceeding through various stages of justification for his position, MacIntyre lays out a case for a 
NeoAristotelian alternative to the defective histories and limitations of expressivism. For our 
purposes, three aspects of this account are most pertinent. First, the development of moral agency, 
for MacIntyre, requires the cultivation of prohairesis, the term used by Aristotle to designate 
“desire informed by reason or […] reason informed by desire.”25 The tension between desire and 
reason generates the intertwined questions, “What do I want?” and “What do I do?”—pressing 
self-conscious beings to question the genesis of our desires and if they are really our own.26 
Secondly, here reason has a particular shape—it is associated with the determination of 
objective goods. For MacIntyre, moral action is the result of acting rationally, that is, to act with a 
good reason or, in other words, “for the sake of achieving some good or preventing or avoiding 
some evil.”27 As reason is informed by the desire for the good, equally, rationality must shape 
desire into the full maturity of virtue through practice. This iterative, recursive, never-ending 
process not only develops ethical discernment, or phronesis, as one of the cardinal virtues of the 
person, but also allows her to learn and progress as a moral agent over the course of her life.28 
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What distinguishes the virtuous person, within an Aristotelian perspective, then, is not merely that 
she does the right thing, but that she does the right thing, at the right time, for the right reason, in 
the right way, with rightly formed desires or affections. 
Thirdly, this is never an individual pursuit or process. In fact, what makes humans peculiar 
kinds of animals is that we are social creatures possessing unique capacities to alter and transform 
our environment. For Aristotle, this unique power is essentially encapsulated in the human capacity 
for language, zoon logon echon. Not only does language give us the unique capacity for reflection, 
this unique human ability to communicate makes possible deeper and more complex forms of 
collaboration and association and, critically, the mutual identification and pursuit of common 
goods.29 The tense structure of language also provides for the possibility of envisioning alternative 
futures. This allows humans to set goals and embark on mutually shared objectives, creating 
expectations of one another as well as leading to a sense of satisfaction or disappointment with the 
eventual outcomes.30 Finally, language offers a vehicle through which to recount stories about 
lives, the challenges faced, the accomplishments achieved, the failures endured, and the endeavors 
taken. Such narratives offer a greater extent of personhood.31 Enabling a distinct form of collective 
life, linguistically comprised communities are necessary for growth and formation in virtue, 
providing a platform for identifying mistakes and what can be learned from them. Thus, collective 
life, for NeoAristotelians, becomes an extended enquiry into how best to live, or, a dilated 
argument in pursuit of truth and good.32 
MacIntyre’s NeoAristotelian view, accordingly, poses a full-throated critique of contemporary 
moral theory. The “Morality” that at present prevails in modernized societies, for MacIntyre, is 
one based on profoundly misguided premises and fictional concepts: predominantly, utility and 
human rights.33 Thus, despite the gains that may have been made for certain groups, the basic 
presuppositions of this ethical system carry an insidious genetic deformity that renders the system 
as a whole incoherent and corrupted.34 In After Virtue, MacIntyre notes suggestively that this 
deformity must have been rooted in a catastrophic social event—except that, surreally, in the case 
of moral discourse, the precipitating cataclysm was not recognized as such. In fact, from the 
standpoint of academic history, the event “must remain largely invisible.”35 It is only in Ethics in 
the Conflicts of Modernity that MacIntyre brings it fully into view. That insidious flaw is, we 
discover, the possessive individualism of capitalism traceable to its tumultuous emergence in the 
Eighteenth Century. 
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2. The Destructive Forces of Capitalism: MacIntyre as Anti-Anti-Marxist 
Harking back to some of his earliest writings, in Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre 
returns to Marx to unveil the socio-economic and political conditions that gave rise to emotivism. 
As he argues, people did not all of a sudden—sometime between 1630 and 1850—discover that 
they had feelings or lose the function of their rational faculties. Rather, the emergence of 
expressivism, and the shift away from an Aristotelianism that had held sway in Western culture 
for the better part of two millennia, was the result of a larger social shift. This transformation was 
catalyzed by the introduction of powerful forces in the late 1700s that altered the entire culture, 
reconfiguring human interactions, thought, and moral considerations.36 While in After Virtue 
MacIntyre largely narrates this shift almost entirely via the influences of various philosophers and 
their thoughts and arguments, in Ethics at the End of Modernity, he finally tells the other half of 
the story—in fact, the most important half. Here he zeroes in on the real culprit behind the 
catastrophic transformations of “modernity” for ethics: the unparalleled force of capitalism. 
MacIntyre proceeds in two steps. In the first, he more closely examines the work of eighteenth-
century empiricist philosopher David Hume, the progenitor of all expressivists. While Hume 
figures in the narrative of After Virtue, in the present volume MacIntyre digs deeper, unmasking a 
critical and often overlooked aspect of Hume’s work. Hume’s position originates from a utilitarian 
logic that reductively equates good with pleasure and evil with pain, rejecting the Aristotelian 
distinction between objects that merely attract and those that are ultimately good.37 Any greater 
ends or goods which may not exactly pique immediate desire or titillate one with pleasure are 
discarded. In a deft sleight of hand, Hume then asserts that pleasure and pain as the content of good 
and evil provide a universal—and universally agreed upon—structure for morality. This general 
and universal agreement in sentiments and affections, for Hume, precedes the standards societies 
derive for moral action and practical reason.38 Per his empiricism, his ethics proceeds as a 
cataloging of habits, sentiments, and affections natural to humankind. These provide the universal 
code of morality. 
But was it? MacIntyre notes how radically Hume’s account differed from the account of 
morality that had held for centuries, in which human virtue and flourishing were deeply interwoven 
with both individual and common goods necessarily achieved through specific social roles, the 
local political order, and contextual relationships.39 Such a position continued to be held by many 
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in Hume’s context, particularly by those in different social classes, who accounted very differently 
for desires, sentiments, and more importantly goods.40 
What is more, MacIntyre unveils Hume’s subtle bias toward wealth. He highlight’s Hume’s 
essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” where Hume simply asserts a 
correlation between pleasure or positive desires and riches, stating: “Avarice, or the desire of gain, 
is an universal passion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons.”41 Or, as 
MacIntyre continues: 
 
In his Treatise [on Human Nature, Hume] had asserted that “Nothing has a greater 
tendency to give us an esteem for any person than his power and riches,” and he 
had explained “the satisfaction we take in the riches of others, and the esteem we 
have for the possessors” by referring first to the possessions of the rich “such as 
houses, gardens, equipages” and the like, which “being agreeable in themselves, 
necessarily produce a sentiment of pleasure in everyone, that considers or surveys 
them,” secondly to our “expectation of advantage from the rich and powerful by 
our sharing of their possessions,” and thirdly to “sympathy which makes us partake 
of the satisfaction of everyone, that approaches us.”42 
 
As MacIntyre notes further, whenever Hume comments on economic questions, be it progress that 
has been made from less sophisticated agricultural societies to his contemporaneous commercial, 
mercantile context, it appears that “there is rarely a hint that the continuing and growing prosperity 
of the rich and powerful has invited anything other than the applause and approbation of the less 
prosperous.”43 
In other words, not only does Hume conflate pleasure/good and pain/evil and then blithely 
assert that desire for gain is “natural” and that wealth is universally perceived as a source of 
positive sentiments, he then subtly embeds economics at the heart of his moral system. In 
presenting a decontextualized, yet highly peculiar, account of putatively “natural” and “universal” 
morality, Hume at best fails to acknowledge the import of his own social context and location on 
the very theory of morality he promotes. Even as he promotes it as universal common sense, 
Hume’s moral theory arises within a specific context—namely, the eighteenth-century British 
social and economic order—and bears all the trappings of that social location.44 
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MacIntyre then zeroes in on a key point: 
 
What I am suggesting is not only that some of Hume’s claims were mistaken, but 
also that one effect of his advancing them in the way that he did was to conceal and 
disguise from his readers the importance of certain facts about the condition of their 
social and economic order […]. [His supposedly universal morality] functioned so 
as to conceal from the view of many of his contemporaries the underlying moral 
and social conflicts of their society and by doing so sustained the workings of the 
agricultural, commercial, and mercantile economy to the profit of the some and to 
the detriment of others, others who are for the most part invisible to Hume.45 
 
In other words, from the outset, modern moral theory was engaged in a process of concealing and 
disguising its role in supporting and sustaining the radically new social and economic institutions 
that emerged in Britain in the latter part of the Eighteenth Century and continued to morph in 
increasingly destructive ways since. In doing so, Morality veils as much as it informs, providing 
an ethical patina for the social processes of a regnant capitalism. Based on the frail tethers of a 
fabricated consensus, from Hume and Kant to Mill, Gibbard, and ultimately Rawls, modern ethics, 
for MacIntyre, is plagued by a degenerative and disorienting ailment, a condition that leads in the 
end to a Nietzschean will-to-power. Thus, not only does expressivism perpetuate fragmentation 
and un-ending moral disagreement. It is equally unable to acknowledge its own socio-historical 
conditioning, ill-equipped even to see the force of capitalism as a socio-cultural power that shapes 
its basic commitments. But not only is it unable to see these dynamics—it also simultaneously 
conceals, veils, and disguises them. For expressivism is, by design and from its inception, the 
moral theory capitalism requires, enabling this economic mutation to function invisibly, 
inexorably, insidiously. 
For MacInytre, the theorist who can best help us see these dynamics is Karl Marx, or at least 
the Marx of the first volume of Capital, whom MacIntyre views as following an Aristotelian 
trajectory.46 In Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre makes his lifelong indebtedness to 
Marx all-the-more evident by dilating on three essential components of the current situation to be 
learned from Marx. First, Marx’s theory of surplus value exposes the exploitative nature of capital 
as an accumulative regime. For MacIntyre, following Marx, deception is at the heart of capitalism. 
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It is “a mode of presentation of relationships that disguises and deceives,” one of the main 
deceptions being the theory of surplus value.47 “Surplus value”—that fiction by which capitalists 
generate profits—is nothing other than “unpaid labor” (a.k.a., theft). But this fact is concealed 
from the laborers: 
 
those whose labor power had thus become a commodity did not recognize 
themselves as, and even now generally do not recognize themselves as, having 
become in this respect commodities to be exchanged for money, to be bought and 
sold at whatever rate the relevant market dictates. They thought and think of 
themselves in quite other ways and understandably so […]. The relations of 
exchange through which those who own the means of production appropriate the 
unpaid labor of productive workers are disguised by their legal form as the 
contractual relations of free individuals, each of them seeking what she or he takes 
to be best for her or himself.48 
 
As such, secondly, capital reshapes moral anthropology and our understanding of society—how 
people have to learn to think about themselves and their relations to others if they are to act in 
accordance with the operations of capital. That is, Marx uncovers how capital disciplines its 
denizens for participation in the market.49 In order to understand the emaciated ethics that pervades 
modern societies, one must grasp the complete system of dissimulation that characterizes 
capitalism, depleting and displacing the true goods of life and wizening politics. 
Thirdly, for MacIntyre, following Marx, a critique of the field of economics and the education 
it provides is essential. Capitalism is not merely the organizing structure of one isolated segment 
of human existence; rather, its dominant logic, anthropology, and view of social relations 
legitimate its expansion into all areas, solidifying it as an entire, ordered way of life.50 As a result, 
MacIntyre’s critique of modern liberalism sees the processes of capitalism—as well as the theories 
and theorists that legitimate these processes and disseminate its rationality—to be deeply at odds 
with the kinds of goods intrinsic to the development and practice of the virtues. Beyond its 
“completely Weberian” composition, capitalist society can only foster an anemic morality.51 
While philosophical critique of these dynamics is essential, MacIntyre again points us beyond 
a simply philosophical solution. As Kelvin Knight contends, 
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The conclusion to which MacIntyre was moving, and to which he had already long 
been moving as a Marxist, was that Nietzschean theory and capitalist practice had 
to be opposed in the name not of some theoretical or future ideal, but of some actual 
and present kind of practice.52 
 
And for MacIntyre, practice can only be embodied in communities. He notes in Ethics in the 
Conflicts of Modernity that, to counter the moral theories of Hume and others, any challengers had 
to present “not just an alternative body of theory, but the possibility of an alternative way of life 
to the capitalist way of life.”53 But he had likewise stated this as early as 1960: 
 
The individual then cannot win his freedom by asserting himself against society; 
and he cannot win it through capitalist society. To be free is only possible in some 
new form of society which makes a radical break with the various oppressions of 
capitalism.54 
 
Thus, the answer lies not in philosophy alone but in a revolutionary praxis borne out in ethical 
communities joined in their desire for the higher goods and emancipated to pursue those shared 
ends. 
 
3. MacIntyre, Radical Pedagogy, and New Communities of Practice 
All along, then, the question for MacIntyre with his turn to virtue has been: “So in what direction 
should radical critiques of capitalism move?”55 Or, better, in a state of “capitalist unfreedom,” how 
do we cultivate the “revolutionary discipline” needed to achieve freedom?56 At the end of After 
Virtue, he can see his first attempt at an answer, though as through a glass darkly. As he now 
famously stated there, recalling the historic events of the sixth century: 
 
A crucial turning point […] occurred when men and women of good will turned 
aside from the task of shoring up the Roman imperium and ceased to identify the 
continuation of civility and moral community with the maintenance of that 
imperium. What they set themselves to achieve instead—not often recognizing 
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fully what they were doing—was the construction of new forms of community 
within which the moral life could be sustained […]. What matters at this stage is 
the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the 
intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are 
already upon us.57 
 
In 1981, MacIntyre gestured vaguely toward a new, “but doubtless very different” St. Benedict. 
This has led prominent religious conservatives to martial MacIntyre’s thought in support of 
proposals for founding new enclaves marked by social isolation and retreat from contemporary 
culture. Insofar as these proposals call for a very similar St. Benedict, they proceed on poor 
readings.58 
Rather, as Knight has demonstrated, what lies at the heart of MacInytre’s entire oeuvre is a 
sustained commitment to Marx’s notion of “revolutionary practice.”59 Thus, while MacIntyre’s 
philosophy is Aristotelian, as Knight notes, he is not interested in conserving political order as was 
Aristotle, but with how to change and transform it.60 MacIntyre’s notion of politics is one of active 
teaching and learning, not irrational dominance. “Politically, locality is important,” Knight 
comments, “because it can afford participation in rational deliberation and decision-making to 
all.”61 The ultimate goal of MacIntyre’s ethical philosophy, then, is to provide a moral theory for 
the Marxist pursuit of overcoming the alienation, fragmentation, exploitation, dehumanization, and 
social disfigurement that come with capitalism. 
In Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre makes more explicit what valid sorts of 
challenges to capital’s Morality might look like. Contrary to orthodox Marxists who have 
privileged party power and the revolutionary working class as agents of social change, creating a 
false binary between institutions or spontaneity, he sides more deliberately with the English 
Distributists whose Thomistic precepts, articulated through the work of Leo XIII initiating the 
tradition of Catholic social thought, gave view to “a series of genuinely local political initiatives 
through which the possibilities of a grassroots distribution and sharing of power and property could 
be achieved.”62 Against the total depravity capitalism engenders across all layers of society, 
MacIntyre sees such micro-political experiments as necessary for the resurrection of virtue and the 
reconstruction of human flourishing. 
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MacIntyre is joined in this conclusion by other critics of neoliberalism.63 But while these figures 
all gesture toward new local experiments in community or collectives as the answer, none talk 
about how to begin building such entities. In this section, we offer one practical, pedagogical way 
to do just this. We argue that MacIntyre’s impressionistic trajectory toward social practices 
cultivated among local communities should be read in consonance with the kinds of “base 
communities” associated with Freirean radical pedagogy and action. Such communities of practice 
inculcate new collective visions of the good while building power and taking account of the 
experience of those oppressed by the regnant system. 
MacIntyre himself seems to be grasping at this conclusion when he argues in his 1995 “Preface 
to Marxism and Christianity”: 
 
In this situation [of global capitalism] what is most urgently needed is a politics of 
self-defense for all those local societies that aspire to achieve some relatively self-
sufficient and independent form of participatory practice-based community and that 
therefore need to protect themselves from the corrosive effects of capitalism and 
the depredations of state power.64 
 
What MacIntyre calls for, in essence, are local, transformative, and educational communities of 
practice. Rather than a statist focus, which may have characterized his earlier Marxian views, 
MacIntyre’s mature thought looks to the creation and sustaining of local ethical communities 
where collective identity and meaning derived from emancipatory self-activity in pursuit of a real 
common good can be conducted.65 
In substance, MacIntyre’s project dovetails well with twentieth-century Brazilian educator and 
philosopher Paulo Freire, who stressed the need to generate radical educational communities of 
praxis. Born in 1921 in Recife, Brazil, Freire was no stranger to the poverty and misery of the 
region. He came of age during the fallout from the 1929 Great Depression, which threw his own 
middle-class family into destitution. Thus, his experience of living under social, economic, and 
political domination and oppression led him to the field of education as a critical site for the 
struggle of liberation. Only eight years MacIntyre’s senior, he too was deeply influenced by 
Marxist thinkers of the time and took his doctorate in education at the University of Recife in 1955. 
The focus of his life’s work was the development of a radical pedagogy for those on the bottom of 
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society, aimed at learning with them in direct engagement with the concrete realities of their 
oppression in order to liberate them and together to transform their world.66 He describes this 
radical program for education in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed, a work that, as we will 
demonstrate, shares many similarities and overlaps with MacIntyre’s own project. Moreover, we 
contend, Freire’s philosophy of education provides a way of generating the kinds of critical, 
alternative communities of practice aimed at transformation that MacIntyre’s virtue ethics seeks 
to promote. 
For Freire, the essence of this revolutionary work is to foster dialogical action.67 Dialogue here 
is not uninterested discourse, or remote communication over sustained distance, or hostile 
argument. Rather, it is the forging of a collective rationality and consciousness through the 
development of deep relational connections. Distinguished from the monological postures that 
pervade situations of domination wherein “some name on behalf of others,” dialogue for Freire “is 
an encounter among women and men who name the world […]. [I]t is an act of creation.”68 He 
continues, “Dialogue cannot exist […] in the absence of a profound love for the world and for 
people,” because, as an encounter of “united reflection and action,” dialogue moves to transform 
a dehumanizing and oppressive structure in order to make it more human and fulfilling.69 In the 
same way that MacIntyre despises the reign of managerialism, Freire too sees such top-down, 
professionalized modes of learning as inherently problematic. What Freire adds to MacIntyre’s 
more philosophical argument is a mode of pedagogical encounter for not only building the skills 
to engage in the sort of moral discourse MacIntyre seeks, but also for creating and building the 
kinds of transformative communities that cultivate identity, purpose, shared rationality, and 
common goods. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in Freire’s connection to and investment in Catholic ecclesial 
base communities (comunidades eclesiales de base). Challenging a church establishment (even in 
its modernizing version) that was unwilling to critique or break with the status quo, Freire’s close 
relationship with the “red bishop” Dom Hélder Cámara and the radical Columbian priest Camilo 
Torres set him on the side of peoples’ movements which embraced and utilized his problem-posing 
and dialogical approach.70 As a result, he also deeply influenced the liberation theologies emerging 
at the time, shaping the involvement of clergy (Catholic and Protestant) in their engagement with 
campesinos (or working people) of their towns and villages. These local communities gathered in 
a Freirean-mode of learning practice to constructively challenge the hierarchy and socio-political 
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exploitation of the capitalist state all across Latin America. And it was in concert with these 
communities that a whole network of ecclesial base communities arose. Gathered to pray and to 
reflect upon and discuss Scripture as well as new social thought documents coming out of Vatican 
II, the participants in these communities sought to forge a new society of justice and freedom 
consolidated in their shared identity and mutual pursuit of shared goods.71 
Following Freire’s radical curriculum, these base communities worked against the shaping 
forces of a capitalist state and its mode of domination. First, they resisted the deep fragmentation 
and isolation inherent in the individualizing dynamic of capitalism. They did this by presenting an 
alternative: communion in dialogue, where “sharing something deeper” gave rise to the possibility 
of “common action” based in a deeply relational, shared ethical identity.72 Second, such a 
community required the capacity to reason together about crucial human goods, that is, to cultivate 
a shared rationality through the process of “conscientization” (conscientização) aimed at practice 
and action. In this way, knowledge was deepened and grew through a co-investigatory process of 
radically democratic education.73 Thus, finally, not only did communities consolidated in such a 
way learn to address the economic, social, and political realities they faced and to discard the 
fabulations of oppressive exploiters, but they did so in a way that forged a shared identity in an 
ethical community capable of cultivating shared goods and virtues. 
Over and against forms of education that merely reproduce the status quo in the service of the 
dominant regime by silencing, manipulating, and dividing the oppressed, Freire argues for a form 
of dialogical pedagogy that instills critical consciousness and builds cultural action between 
teachers and the people as the road to revolution. While the former is anti-dialogical, Freire puts 
forth a radical mode of pedagogy that moves cooperatively, based in an ongoing dialogue with the 
people that begins from their experiences, helps them to begin to problematize the given, and 
works together to build a unified pursuit of an alternative way of life.74 Dialogue rejects 
dehumanization and begins the movement toward liberation in communion. 
On this central tenet, MacIntyre and Freire deeply overlap. It is not incidental that for Aristotle, 
and thus for MacIntyre, education is at the heart of virtue. A society structured by virtue requires 
a people educated and formed to engage in the politics of the good. But too often contemporary 
virtue theorists—many of whom claim to be MacIntyrean—forward a conservative mode of 
education. Indeed, MacIntyre himself may be responsible for this due to his extensive focus on 
mentorship and apprenticeship. Too frequently, apprenticeship calls to mind the forms of 
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education, even when practical or technical in nature, that Paulo Freire memorably labeled 
“banking.”75 A set compendium of knowledge known by the instructor is recited to the student, 
who passively accepts the knowledge and later regurgitates it. Such forms of knowledge tend 
toward paternalism, hierarchy, and stasis and are better fitted for crafts than instilling the 
knowledge of ethics. 
As such, these approaches are incapable of forming students in the skills of rationality, virtue, 
and ability to advance fundamental human and social goods through shared practices. MacIntyre, 
of course, registers this. Indeed, the whole of MacIntyre’s work, as Romand Coles has suggested, 
points to the centrality of “contingency, conflict, difference, heterogenous traditions, and a version 
of dialogical enlightenment and politics.”76 One may even see the similarities in the structure of 
MacIntyre’s argument in Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, wherein he begins by questioning 
what is presumed and then proceeds to chart a conversational path toward the ultimate question of 
what does it mean to live well. MacIntyre’s appeal to tradition and reason is neither Descartes’s 
pure geometry nor Hegel’s end of history, but instead recognizes that the heart of a community of 
virtue is continuous argument and deliberation.77 To quote Coles again: 
 
[MacIntyre’s] hope is that if we can initiate spaces, sensibilities, and practices 
through which to cultivate particular traditioned rationalities and genuine 
contestation here, these might (through numerous political struggles) eventually 
spread to the public sphere and throughout society.78 
 
Thus, for MacIntyre, as for the oppressed subjected to domination, the problem is monological 
uniformity that denies the pursuit of more ultimate, if contested, goods. 
MacIntyre tends to envisage the Catholic university as an ideal space for recovering this 
dialogical practice.79 But traditional university structures as well as their contemporary 
neoliberalized deformations mount significant barriers to his project. Moreover, given their self-
enterprising and transitory nature, engrafting university students into base communities remains 
challenging. Yet we believe a contemporary possibility for advancing a MacIntyrean mode of 
revolution requires collaborative, participatory experiments that bridge academic and community 
divides with the aim of reconsolidating alternative forms of local life. Just such a Freirean 
educational approach can provide a means for generating the kinds of micro-political experiments 
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necessary if we are to introduce students to and thereby cultivate the sorts of ethical communities 
to which MacIntyre gestures. 
Mary Ann Hinsdale, Helen Lewis, and Maxine Waller recount an example of such experiment 
in their documentation of a five-year (1987–1992) community development process in Ivanhoe, 
Virginia.80 Charting the story of a small, rural community in the Appalachian mountains, they offer 
an account of “the creative survival techniques that people developed” as they faced the post-
industrial decline of their town and the emerging socio-economic pressures associated with the 
expansion of neoliberal capitalism.81 Beginning with community education and problem-posing 
inquiry, the experiment in Ivanhoe brought academics and community members together in a 
process of participatory research aimed at rebuilding their community and transforming their 
situation. With the aim of reconstituting Ivanhoe’s way of life, they recognized that this goal could 
not be achieved through professional techniques of planning but must come by way of “people 
development and community building: education, building self-esteem, understanding history, 
mobilizing people in all their diversity.”82 They describe the effort, no less, as springing from the 
formation of an “Appalachian base-community.”83 
While the Ivanhoe community continues to struggle to define its own future, we suggest that 
this kind of micro-political experiment provides an example for the kind of community 
reconsolidation and transformation central to both Freire and MacIntyre. Even more, working at 
the base of American society through a process of participatory and collaborative education, 
Ivanhoe provides a tangible example of how communities of practice (CoPs) embody the kind of 
radical pedagogical relationships between academics and local communities necessary for staving 
off the corrosive and corrupting tides of aggressive capitalism and transforming the teaching of 
ethics.84 Let us quickly highlight four ways that this communities of practice approach responds 
to MacIntyre’s insights on prohairesis, community, virtue, and social change. 
First, proharesis stands at the center of communities of practice. CoPs acknowledge the 
legitimate role of desire. For Freire, such participatory modes of learning engage the desires of 
those involved in a shared process of consciousness-raising that enlivens their aspirations, 
identifies where those aspirations are being frustrated or negated, and then activates a social mode 
of learning to enact the needed changes. But they also help practitioners (community members, 
students, and faculty) move beyond simple emotivism or expressivism. Springing from a problem-
posing origin, CoPs draw practitioners into the pursuit of knowledge aimed at a shared good. 
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Through co-creative, participatory inquiry, they recursively bring practitioners’ desires into an 
intentional, rational, analytical relationship with those goods. This not only moves practitioners 
beyond solipsistic understandings of desire. Further, as MacIntyre notes, “To discover what we 
share with others, to rediscover common desire, is to acquire a new moral standpoint.”85 
Second, CoPs by their very nature begin to rebuild community in a variety of ways. They train 
practitioners in a constellation of constitutive core practices requisite for establishing a shared 
venture. Facilitating the social production of knowledge, basic practices of dialogue and discussion 
allow participants to negotiate insights and differences while developing shared rationalities for 
the essential practices of their community. These ethico-political practices iteratively deepen 
community. When configured in Freirean fashion, this cooperative inquiry fuses conscientization 
with the kind of relationship-building needed for the practice of a shared way of life and the 
collective theorizing inherent to it. Within such communities, people discover the power they have 
to work from their own knowledge and to engage in their own research, thus activating them 
together to pursue higher, common goods.86 
Third, as is already evident, the social activity of learning conducted within such CoPs advances 
the growth of virtue in practitioners by involving them in the communal pursuit of excellences of 
practice. Whether it be literacy training, Scripture reading, prayer, developing sustainable farming 
practices, or generating micro-economic alternatives, CoPs involve participants in the active 
inquiry necessary for performing such endeavors well. As collaborative learning groups, CoPs 
intertwine the various experiences and competencies of both academics and community members 
in a mutual process of refinement, adjustment, and even change that begins to build a social fabric 
capable of sustaining that knowledge and practice.87 And when set as Freirean-informed base 
communities, they move from the people up, generating the changes needed to make these virtuous 
practices possible and enduring without succumbing to stale and rigidly uniform bureaucratic 
structures.88 
Finally, via CoPs, participants also embark on the longer-term task of challenging the pervading 
structures of capitalism and the managerial state by generating ethical social alternatives. In other 
words, CoPs work to build the kind of socio-ethical relations necessary to pursue a collective good 
and sustain that pursuit over time. Marx taught that real freedom is the deepest challenge to 
capitalism. Like any imperial regime, capitalism thrives on the backs of its captives, growing its 
accumulation on their stunted and immiserated lives. Freirean-informed CoPs aim to alter this 
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structure through the intentional activation of the base of this disfigured society, deploying a 
radical pedagogy of consciousness-raising that moves these communities out of passive silence 
and into the communal process of building their own ethico-political alternatives.89 Against the 
fragmentation, atomization, dehumanization, deinstitutionalization, desymbolization, and 
desubjectification wrought by neoliberal capitalism, Freirean-informed CoPs provide a collective 
mode of socio-cultural transformation wherein those subjected to exploitation and the captivity of 
capitalism can begin to redefine and reconfigure their world. Thus, they can function as radical 
Monte Cassino-like outposts in a struggle of education against the inculcation of neoliberalism’s 
principles and logic. 
 
4. Revolutionary Pedagogy for a Twenty-First Century Ethics 
Communities of practice are the kinds of elemental social learning systems where an alternative, 
even revolutionary, way of life can be cultivated and performed. While not nearly as 
comprehensive as those envisaged by MacIntyre and Freire, these embryonic communities of 
practice offer a starting point for students and faculty to begin to learn the practices and habits 
necessary for reshaping pedagogy, themselves, and their communities toward new forms of society 
that can counter the oppressions and fragmentations of capitalism they both name as the root of 
our current social and moral malaise. Based in the conviction that learning is a social phenomenon, 
communities of practice are the kinds of participatory units wherein new identities are forged.90 
They “can be thought of as shared histories of learning” that provide new possibilities of collective 
identity.91 As sites for the cultivation of “revolutionary discipline,” they can function as a radically 
new approach to teaching ethics by seeding the recovery of virtue, the conscientization of 
participants, the pursuit of freedom, and the rebuilding of community, toward the end of real social 
change. Creating time for such micro-politics, for tending to the goods of humanity, for cultivating 
lives worth living, they offer the opportunity of slowing things down, possibly giving enough space 
for us to re-collect our history from its currently headlong trajectory into the dead end of global 
capitalism. 
When set within a Freirean radical pedagogy, these kinds of basic social learning systems 
become radically democratic arenas for the cultivation of the kinds of virtues and prophetic witness 
called for by MacIntyre.92 To Freireans, thus, MacIntyre’s work on virtue could be a helpful guide 
for building up the communion so central to their common pedagogical project, even as Freire’s 
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emphasis on dialogue might refine the hierarchical interpretations of MacIntyre’s valorizing of 
apprenticeship. Both, in parallel and, we think, in ways that deeply overlap, seek “a new kind of 
society rooted in the centrality of a better humankind,” consonant with the Catholic commitments 
they share.93 Both believe education is not neutral, and therefore, hope to inspire communities of 
practice hat challenge the status quo and pursue transformation. Freire offers a method to 
MacIntyre’s substance: a participatory pedagogy for the cultivation of virtue. 
Both are revolutionaries of a peculiar kind. Theirs will be a slow revolution, not a decisive and 
catastrophic break. But if we do not wish merely to replace an order (or disorder) of fragmentation 
and sheer competition with a new one of more of the same, we will need the time to cultivate in 
our students the skills for building community, shaping an alternative rationality, and cultivating 
the correlative human virtues so as to capacitate them to reprise these processes more permanently 
wherever they go. And as we teach, so will we be taught, as this new approach to pedagogy holds 
the promise of radically reshaping how faculty inhabit our own universities and communities—
capacitating us to be not only those who create new knowledge, but those who likewise catalyze 
and engage in social change. True revolution, after all, means revolution for everyone. 
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